intelligence effort to determine what, if anything, is happening in those various locations.

Once again, the commander's intent and a METT-T analysis are essential to the planning process. Observations at the JRTC support the idea that smoke does indeed draw the attention of the opposing force (OPFOR). The smoke platoon must therefore be prepared to react to OPFOR contact during all missions.

Smoke alone is not enough to deceive the OPFOR. Psychological operations, aviation, artillery, and infantry—all conducted under the limited visibility afforded by a good smoke plan—can help create deception with false insertions, H-hours, and troop movements.

Obscuration. Obscuration may be the most difficult smoke mission and, contrary to popular belief, not all smoke obscures. Obscuring smoke is the smoke employed directly on the enemy. Artillery delivered munitions can provide short periods of coverage for H-hour missions and smoke grenades can be used for close combat. But extended obscuration of enemy positions requires a great deal of logistical support.

In theory, smoke platoons, given the appropriate terrain and weather, can smoke an objective from the line of departure (LD). But those conditions are rarely reliable, and smoke platoons on or across the LD are usually dead smoke platoons (unless they are mechanized).

If a commander does decide to smoke the objective using generated smoke, a detailed plan must be developed. Unless conditions are perfect, the best results are obtained from using HC (hexachloroethane) and WP (white phosphorus) artillery munitions and smoke grenades on the objective. Commanders can still use smoke generators to screen movement to and across the LD and to deceive the enemy.

On the JRTC battlefield, these three types of smoke missions can be used effectively, and any mission is improved by the integration of a smoke plan. Brigade and battalion staff chemical personnel can provide their commanders with such a plan, but it is up to the unit commander to request it.

A well-thought-out plan that is integrated into a unit's mission will improve the unit's ability to accomplish its mission. More important, it will improve the unit's training. And any unit that leaves the JRTC with better trained soldiers can say that it has "won" on the JRTC battlefield.

Major Paul B. Short is senior chemical observer-controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center. He was previously chemical officer of the 18th Field Artillery Brigade and NBC element director, XVIII Airborne Corps. He is a 1978 ROTC graduate of Old Dominion University.

Captain David G. Shoffner is smoke/decontamination platoon observer-controller at the JRTC. He was previously battalion chemical officer in the 1st Battalion, 39th Field Artillery and the 1st Battalion, 504th Infantry. He is a 1985 ROTC graduate of Centenary College of Louisiana.

Equipment Deployment Boxes

CAPTAIN ROBERT E. MILANI

Deploying a company to the field for training exercises or during no-notice readiness alerts can be a stressful task for the chain of command, particularly the company commander. Companies that do not have good deployment practices and SOPs (standing operating procedures) usually run short of time in readying their equipment and personnel.

One way to make the most of the time available, particularly during no-notice readiness alerts, is to prepare equipment deployment boxes ahead of time. Company commanders who use deployment boxes gain several advantages: The boxes save time in preparing equipment; expedite and improve hand receipting and accountability of equipment; eliminate the worry that the company has forgotten something; and allow the commanders to use only fragmentary orders concerning required equipment during their warning orders or operations orders.

The following are examples of deployment boxes that can be used by companies organized and equipped under either light, air assault, or heavy tables of organization and equipment (TOEs). (Few light companies have the capacity to transport these boxes as listed. They are normally drawn from the commodity areas and the equipment distributed down to the soldier level in the platoon areas.) One of each type of box is prepared for each rifle and mortar platoon. There should be at least a three-day supply of all expendable items.

Supply Box:

- Chemical lights (one box infrared,

three boxes platoon color).

- Combat acetate (one roll).
- Engineer tape (one roll).
- Sandbags (one bundle).
- Pioneer tools (two shovels and two picks).
- Picket pounder.
- Bean bag lights (four, with color caps, and two batteries per light).
- 100-mile-per-hour tape (five rolls).
- 550 cord (one roll)
- Trash bags (brown, black, or green).
- Toilet paper (three dozen rolls).
- Memorandum pads (ten).
- Ink pens and alcohol pens (one box).
- Sharpened pencils (one box).

The platoon sergeant is responsible for maintaining the supply box, and the supply sergeant for replenishing it after each field exercise or alert.

Platoon Box:

- Bayonets (number authorized per platoon).
- Signal mirrors (five).
- Compasses (12).
- Binoculars (number authorized per platoon).
- Wire cutters (three).
- M60 spare barrel bags and AG equipment (two).
- VS-17 panels (four).

Communications Box:

- AN/PRC-126 radios with accessories (five).
- SINCGARS radios or AN/PRC-77s (number authorized per platoon, with accessories).
- TA-1 telephones (four).
- Field wire (number of rolls as determined by RTO.

- Extra hand microphones.
- Batteries (three dozen for AN/PVS-4, -5, -7, D-cell, AA, AN/PRC-77 and AN/PRC-126).

The platoon sergeant is responsible for maintaining the platoon box, and the platoon radio-telephone operator (RTO) is responsible for maintaining the communications box.

Each of these boxes is maintained under lock and key and stored in the supply room. Each is deployed to the field at the discretion of the platoon leader or company commander. A pre-printed hand receipt is maintained on the inside top of each box listing all items in it. All of these boxes should be inspected quarterly during command inspections or monthly ten-percent inventories. Two keys should be maintained for each box—one by the responsible individual and the other by the commodity area chief.

The responsible individuals can presign for their boxes to further expedite the hand-receipting process, but all equipment must still be maintained in the appropriate commodity area for physical security reasons. If individuals elect to pre-sign hand receipts, all boxes should be banded, and serial numbered railroad seals placed through the latches.

The primary purpose of using deployment boxes is to expedite the hand-receipting process and allow the company to concentrate on more important matters.

Captain Robert E. Milani commanded a rifle company in the 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry in Korea and previously served as S-4, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry in Hawaii. He is a 1983 ROTC graduate of Old Dominion University and is now assigned to the 3d Infantry Regiment at Fort Meyer, Virginia.

Hand-to-Hand Combat Training
And the Nine Principles of War

STAFF SERGEANT RAYMOND O. LESO

Light infantrymen use nine principles of war as guidelines when attacking (Field Manual 7-71, The Light Infantry Company, 1987). These same nine principles can be applied to effective hand-to-hand combat. Unfortunately, hand-to-hand combat in most infantry companies is given only minimal coverage at best. But the fact that FM 7-71 specifically mentions using bare hands, garrotes, knives, and bayonets must mean that these skills are intended to be taught and learned.

I propose using the nine principles, in simplified form, as guidelines when